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Summary. The literature on the computation of Nash equilibria inn-person
games is dominated by simplicial methods. This paper is the first to introduce a
globally convergent algorithm that fully exploits the differentiability present in
the problem. It presents an everywhere differentiable homotopy to do the com-
putations. The homotopy path can therefore be followed by several numerical
techniques. Moreover, instead of computing some Nash equilibrium, the algo-
rithm is constructed in such a way that it computes the Nash equilibrium selected
by the tracing procedure of Harsanyi and Selten. As a by-product of our proofs
it follows that for a generic game the tracing procedure defines a unique feasi-
ble path. The numerical performance of the algorithm is illustrated by means of
several examples.
Keywords and Phrases: Computation of equilibria – Noncooperative game the-
ory – Tracing procedure.
JEL Classification Numbers: C63, C72.
1 Introduction
During the past few years, many research fields in which conflicts between agents
arise have benefited from the introduction of game theoretic tools. A further use
of game theory may stagnate for several reasons. One is that there may be a
great number of solutions to a given game. Recent work of McLennan [20]
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shows that the number of Nash equilibria in normal form games of modest
size is huge on average. For instance, the mean number of Nash equilibria in a
game with 4 agents, each having 6 strategies, is estimated to be 2.037, with a
standard error of the estimation of 66. Nevertheless, computation of just a single
Nash equilibrium may prove to be hard in many games of interest. This point is
expressed as follows in van Damme [3]: “In the last two decades, game theoretic
methods have become more and more important in economics and the other
social sciences. Many scientific papers in these areas have the following basic
structure: A problem is modeled as a game, the game is analyzed by computing
its equilibria, and the properties of the latter are translated back into insights
relevant to the original problem.. . . It has been found that the tools may not
be powerful enough. . . For example, many models admit a vast multiplicity of
equilibrium outcomes so that the predictive power of game theoretic analysis is
limited. To increase understanding, it may, hence, be necessary to perfect the
tools.”.
A tool to increase understanding has been suggested in Harsanyi and Sel-
ten [9], who introduce the linear tracing procedure as a means for equilibrium
selection in finiten-person games. The linear tracing procedure is a mathemati-
cal construct that adjusts arbitrary prior beliefs into equilibrium beliefs. First, the
players optimize by playing best responses against identical prior beliefs con-
cerning the play of the other players. Next, they observe that their beliefs are not
met and they subsequently update their beliefs and react optimally there upon.
This updating of beliefs continues until equilibrium beliefs for the game have
been found. Although the term “procedure” suggests a numerical approach, the
tracing procedure itself is a non-constructive method. This brings us to a second
problem, the difficulties involved in solving games of interest, which may ham-
per a further progress in the applications of game theory. We fully agree to the
view expressed in Judd [15] that in general computational methods will serve an
important role in the further development of economic theory, and in this case
in the progress of game theory.
The aim of this paper is to present an algorithm to compute a Nash equilib-
rium for an arbitrary finiten-person game in normal form. Since there is a vast
multiplicity of Nash equilibria in many games, we also find it essential to provide
an algorithm that performs the task of equilibrium selection. In particular, we
want to have an algorithm that computes the Nash equilibrium selected by the
linear tracing procedure. Finally, the algorithm should be fast in that it allows for
the computation of a Nash equilibrium for non-trivial games within reasonable
time limits.
The first procedures for finding an equilibrium inn-person games were de-
veloped simultaneously and independently by Rosenmüller [21] and Wilson [26].
Both methods are generalizations of the procedure of Lemke and Howson [17]
for bimatrix games. Although these methods are not directly suitable for compu-
tational purposes, their common result, the existence of a non-linear path leading
to an equilibrium, was a very important step towards an implementable algorithm
as developed by Garcia, Lemke and Lüthi [5]. Later, a more efficient algorithm
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was proposed in van der Laan, Talman and van der Heijden [16]. A problem
of these algorithms is that they calculate only an approximation of a sample
Nash equilibrium and do not bother about the game-theoretic underpinning of
the calculated equilibrium.
The case of 2-person games is special in that the exact calculation of a
Nash equilibrium is possible due to the linear structure of such a game. For this
class of games, the algorithm of van den Elzen and Talman [4] computes the
Nash equilibrium selected by the linear tracing procedure. The generalization
to n-person games is covered by the algorithm presented in Herings and van
den Elzen [12]. That algorithm, as well as all the other algorithms discussed
above, is a simplicial method. Simplicial methods solve a non-linear equilibrium
problem by solving a piecewise linear approximation of the problem. All known
algorithms that have been shown to converge to a Nash equilibrium for a generic
n-person game, are simplicial methods. A drawback of these methods is that they
do not exploit the differentiable structure that is present inn-person games. For
an excellent survey of methods to compute Nash equilibria in games, we refer
to McKelvey and McLennan [19].
In this paper we propose an algorithm that is shown to converge to a Nash
equilibrium for a genericn-person game. This algorithm is the first to exploit the
differentiability present in games to the full extent. We transform the variables in
the way as proposed in Garcia and Zangwill [6]. To the best of our knowledge this
paper gives the first rigorous proof that after the transformation differentiability
results. The algorithm also solves the equilibrium selection problem in that it
computes the Nash equilibrium selected by the linear tracing procedure.
The algorithm belongs to the class of homotopy methods. The formulation
as a differentiable homotopy makes it possible to apply standard path-following
techniques that are available in professionally programmed software. This makes
implementation on a computer an easy exercise.
As a by-product of our convergence proof, we obtain an elegant and clean
proof of the theorem in Harsanyi [8] that for a generic game the linear tracing
procedure yields a path leading to a unique Nash equilibrium and of the theorem
in Rosenm̈uller [21], Wilson [26], and Harsanyi [7] that for a generic game the
number of Nash equilibria is odd.
The paper has been organized as follows. Some notations and the definition of
the linear tracing procedure are given in Section 2. In Section 3, the properties of
the linear tracing procedure are studied. It is shown that for almost every game,
the linear tracing procedure is formed by a finite union of arcs and loops. Using a
well-chosen transformation of variables, the linear tracing procedure is described
by the zeros of an everywhere differentiable homotopy function in Section 4.
Section 5 discusses the implementation of the homotopy algorithm and gives
some numerical results for randomly generated games. Section 6 summarizes.
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2 The linear tracing procedure
A finite n-person noncooperative game in normal formΓ is given by a tuple
〈N , {S i }i∈N , {ui }i∈N 〉, with S i and ui : S → R the set of pure strategies and
the payoff function of playeri , respectively. The set of players is denoted by
N = {1, . . . , n}. The setS = S 1 × · · · × S n denotes the set of pure strategy
combinations. Playeri hasmi pure strategies. The total number of pure strategies
is given bym∗ =
∑
i∈N m




i . We number the strategies of the players such that pure
strategyj ∈ {1, . . . , mi } of player i is denoted bysij . The union of the pure




A mixed strategy of playeri is a probability distribution onS i . We identify





For σi ∈ Σi , the probability assigned to pure strategysij is given byσij . The
strategy space of the game is therefore equal toΣ = Σ1 × · · · × Σn . Note that
the dimension ofΣ equalsm∗ − n. Given a mixed strategy combinationσ ∈ Σ
and a strategy ¯σi ∈ Σi , we denote by (σ−i , σ̄i ) the mixed strategy that results
from replacingσi by σ̄i . If a mixed strategy combinationσ ∈ Σ is played,
then the probabilityσ(s) that the pure strategy combinations = (s1j 1, . . . , s
n
j n )








i (s). The class of all noncooperative games is denoted by
G .
A mixed strategy combinationσ ∈ Σ is said to be a Nash equilibrium of
gameΓ if σi is a best response againstσ−i for all i ∈ N . The set of Nash
equilibria of gameΓ is denoted by NE(Γ ).
The equilibrium selection theory as presented in Harsanyi and Selten [9] has
the nice feature that it selects a unique Nash equilibrium for every game. The
Harsanyi-Selten theory is to a large extent based on the linear tracing procedure,
a mathematical procedure introduced in Harsanyi [8] that yields a unique Nash
equilibrium for almost every game. To select the unique Nash equilibrium for the
remaining measure zero set of games, Harsanyi and Selten use a construct called
the logarithmic tracing procedure. The linear tracing procedure is used repeatedly
in their equilibrium selection theory to find a unique solution of so-called basic
games and to define risk-dominance relationships between Nash equilibria.
The linear tracing procedure models a process of convergent expectations
by which rational players will come to adopt, and expect each other to adopt,
a particular Nash equilibrium as a solution for a given game. Before applying
the tracing procedure, every player is assumed to have a subjective probability
distribution expressing his expectation about the strategic choices of the other
players. Each player is assumed to use the same theory to determine his subjective
probability distributions. Therefore, all players have the same expectations about
the other players. This common subjective probability distribution is called the
prior. In the naive Bayesian approach, all players choose best responses to their
priors and would in this way reach a strategy-combination that does not constitute
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a Nash equilibrium in general. In the linear tracing procedure, the information on
the best responses is only gradually fed back into the expectations of the players.
As the linear tracing procedure proceeds, both the priors and their best responses
will gradually change until both converge to some Nash equilibrium of the game.
Each generically convergent algorithm to compute a Nash equilibrium can
be interpreted as a procedure that selects an equilibrium, but will in fact be
a completely arbitrary selection procedure. Harsanyi-Selten’s procedure, on the
other hand, is comprehensively studied and finds its origin in the search for an
equilibrium selection method. Therefore, it is attractive to have an algorithm
which computes the equilibrium selected by the Harsanyi-Selten theory.
Consider somen-person gameΓ and some priorp ∈ Σ. For everyt ∈ [0, 1],
the linear tracing procedure generates a Nash equilibrium of the gameΓ t =
〈N , {S i }i∈N , {vi (t)}i∈N 〉, where the payoff functionvi (t) : S → R of player i
is defined by
vi (t , s) = tui (s) + (1− t)ui (p−i , si ).
The gameΓ 0 corresponds to a trivial game, where all players believe that all their
opponents play with probability 1 according to the prior belief. The gameΓ 1 co-
incides with the original gameΓ . A best response against a strategy combination
σ ∈ Σ in the gameΓ t corresponds to a best response against the probability dis-
tribution t [σ] + (1 − t)[p] on S in the gameΓ . The latter probability distribution
does in general not belong toΣ, since it may be correlated.
The linear tracing procedure links a Nash equilibrium of the gameΓ 0 to a
Nash equilibrium ofΓ 1. The set of all Nash equilibria related to the gamesΓ t ,
t ∈ [0, 1], is denoted by
L (Γ, p) =
{
(t , σ) ∈ [0, 1] × Σ
∣∣∣∣ σ ∈ NE(Γ t )
}
.
The linear tracing procedure is said to be feasible if there exists a path inL (Γ, p)
connecting a best response against the prior to a Nash equilibrium of the game
Γ , i.e. there exists a continuous functionγ : [0, 1] → L (Γ, p) such thatγ(0) ∈
L (Γ, p) ∩ ({0} × Σ) and γ(1) ∈ L (Γ, p) ∩ ({1} × Σ). In general there may
be many trajectoriesγ([0, 1]) that link a Nash equilibrium ofΓ 0 to a Nash
equilibrium of Γ 1. If this trajectory is unique, then the linear tracing procedure
is said to be well-defined. If the linear tracing procedure is well-defined, then it
selects a unique Nash equilibrium of the gameΓ .
Schanuel, Simon and Zame [22] have shown that the logarithmic tracing
procedure connects the best responses to the prior beliefs to exactly one Nash
equilibrium. From this result, the feasibility of the linear tracing procedure fol-
lows by an easy limit argument. The proofs related to the logarithmic tracing
procedure use heavy mathematical machinery from the field of algebraic geom-
etry. Herings [11] gives two very short proofs of the feasibility of the linear
tracing procedure that do not involve the logarithmic tracing procedure.
The linear tracing procedure is shown to be well-defined for a genericn-
person game by Harsanyi [8]. His result is that given any prior distribution almost
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all n-person noncooperative games give rise to a well-defined linear tracing
procedure. As a by-product of the convergence proof for our algorithm, we
obtain a clean and elegant proof of Harsanyi’s result.
3 A piecewise differentiable approach
From the previous section we know that the linear tracing procedure contains a
feasible path. The strategy of our algorithm is to end up in a Nash equilibrium
of the game by following that path. A simplicial method that needs very little
structure of the path is implemented in Herings and van den Elzen [12]. We
would like to use path following methods that exploit the differentiability of
the path. Unfortunately, the feasible path displays serious non-differentiabilities
for most games, which makes the computation of Nash equilibria so difficult.
This section analyzes the differentiability properties ofL (Γ, p) and reveals that,
although not necessarily everywhere differentiable, it has a lot of structure.
Let a subsetB∗ of S ∗ be given with the property that for every playeri
there is at least one pure strategysij in B
∗, so B∗ ∩ S i /= ∅ for every playeri .
Such a setB∗ is called admissible. The setsB∗ are used to decomposeL (Γ, p)
in subsetsL (Γ, p, B∗), each having a differentiable manifold structure. The set
L (Γ, p, B∗) contains those elements ofL (Γ, p) where only strategies inB∗ are
played with positive probability. It is defined by
L (Γ, p, B∗) =
{
(t , σ) ∈ L (Γ, p)
∣∣∣∣
sij ∈ B∗ ⇒ σij = 0
sij ∈ B∗ ⇒ sij ∈ argmaxsi

∈S i v




L (Γ, p) =
⋃
B∗L (Γ, p, B
∗).
Two setsL (Γ, p, B∗) andL (Γ, p, B̄∗) can only have a point (t , σ) in common
if there is a playeri and a strategysij such thatσ
i
j = 0 and s
i




i (t , σ−i , si), so s
i
j is a best response toσ
−i that is played with
probability zero.
To analyze the structure ofL (Γ, p) and the setsL (Γ, p, B∗), we design
systems of equalities and inequalities whose solutions characterize these sets.
The Kuhn-Tucker first-order conditions, which provide necessary and sufficient
conditions forσi to be a best response against ¯σ−i in the gameΓ t̄ , are given by
vi (t̄ , σ̄−i , sij ) + λ
i
j − µi = 0, sij ∈ S i ,
λij ≥ 0, σij ≥ 0, λij σij = 0, sij ∈ S i ,∑mi
j=1σ
i
j − 1 = 0.
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Here,λij is the shadowprice of playing strategys
i
j , i.e. the disutility of a marginal
increase in the probabilityσij by which pure strategys
i
j is played. Ifσ
i
j > 0, then
sij is a best response to ¯σ
−i in gameΓ t̄ , which impliesλij = 0. It follows thatµ
i




j − 1 = 0,
makes sure thatσi is a member ofΣi .
Given an admissible subsetB∗, we defineO (Γ, p, B∗) as the set of solutions
(t , σ, λ, µ) to the following system of equalities and inequalities:
(1) vi (t , σ−i , sij ) + λ
i
j − µi = 0, sij ∈ S ∗,
(2) σij = 0, s
i
j ∈ B∗,







j − 1 = 0, i ∈ N ,
(5) σij ≥ 0, sij ∈ B∗,
(6) λij ≥ 0, sij ∈ B∗,
(7) t ≥ 0,
(8) − t + 1 ≥ 0.
Theorem 1 implies that (t , σ) ∈ L (Γ, p, B∗) if and only if there existsλ ∈
R
m∗ andµ ∈ Rn such that the equalities (1)-(4) and the inequalities (5)-(8) are
satisfied.
Theorem 1. Let a game Γ ∈ G and a prior p ∈ Σ be given. For all admissible
subsets B∗ of S ∗, the sets L (Γ, p, B∗) and O (Γ, p, B∗) are C ∞ diffeomorphic.
Proof. Let B∗ be an admissible subset ofS ∗. For everyi ∈ N we take an element
sij ∈ B∗. We define a functionf : [0, 1] × Σ → R × Rm
∗× Rm∗× Rn by f (t , σ) =
(t , σ, λ, µ), whereλi = v
i (t , σ−i , sij ) − vi (t , σ−i , si) andµi = vi (t , σ−i , sij ). Then
f (t , σ) ∈ O (Γ, p, B∗) if and only if (t , σ) ∈ L (Γ, p, B∗). Note thatf defined in
this way is aC ∞ diffeomorphism. 
From Theorem 1 it follows that for all (t , σ) ∈ L (Γ, p, B∗) there is a unique
λ and a uniqueµ such that (t , σ, λ, µ) ∈ O (Γ, p, B∗). Vice versa, for all
(t , σ, λ, µ) ∈ O (Γ, p, B∗) it holds that (t , σ) ∈ L (Γ, p, B∗).
The analysis of the system of equalities and inequalities (1)-(8) provides the
following result.
Theorem 2. For an open set of games Γ ∈ G and priors p ∈ Σ with full
Lebesgue measure,1 for all admissible subsets B∗ of S ∗, the set L (Γ, p, B∗)
is a compact 1-dimensional C ∞ manifold with boundary. Moreover, (t , σ) is a
boundary point of L (Γ, p, B∗) if and only if either σij = 0 for exactly one s
i
j ∈ B∗,
or exactly one sij ∈ B∗ is a best response to σ−i , or t = 0, or t = 1.
1 The setG is endowed with a measure in the standard way, for details see for instance van
Damme [2], page 25.
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Proof. See Appendix. 
This theorem implies that, for almost everyΓ andp, for all admissible setsB∗
of S ∗ the setL (Γ, p, B∗) consists of a finite number of smooth arcs and loops
(see H.1.(vi) of Mas-Colell [18]).2 The structure ofL (Γ, p, B∗) is therefore a
simple one; all kinds of complications like bifurcations, spirals, higher dimen-
sional solution sets, diverging behavior, etc. are excluded. Theorem 2 does not
claim that the setL (Γ, p, B∗) is non-empty. Since the empty set qualifies as a
k -dimensional manifold for anyk by definition, a 1-dimensional manifold may
be empty.
To prove Theorem 2, it is first shown that, for genericΓ andp, O (Γ, p, B∗)
is a compact 1-dimensionalC ∞ manifold with boundary. By Theorem 1, this
property carries over toL (Γ, p, B∗). Notice that the setO (Γ, p, B∗) is described
in (1)-(8) as a system of equalities and inequalities with 2m∗ + n equations and
2m∗+n +1 unknowns. A 1-dimensional solution set is therefore what one expects.
The setL (Γ, p, B∗) consists of a finite number of arcs and loops. If it
contains some arcs, it also has a boundary. The next result makes some very
precise statements on the properties of boundary points.
Theorem 3. For an open set of games Γ ∈ G and priors p ∈ Σ with full
Lebesgue measure, a boundary point (t , σ) of L (Γ, p, B∗) is either
(i) not a boundary point of L (Γ, p, B̄∗) for all B̄∗ /= B∗ and lies in {0, 1} × Σ,
or
(ii) is a boundary point of exactly one L (Γ, p, B̄∗) with B̄∗ /= B∗ and belongs
to (0, 1)× Σ. Moreover, B∗ and B̄∗ differ in exactly one element, say sij , for
which σij = 0 and s
i
j is a best response to σ
−i in Γ t .
Proof. By Theorem 2 it follows that in a boundary point ofL (Γ, p, B∗) exactly
one of the inequalities (5)-(8) is binding. If the binding inequality is (7) or (8)
alternative (i) holds. If one of the inequalities from (5) or (6) is binding, the
second alternative holds. More precisely, if an inequality from (5) is binding, it
holds for exactly onesij ∈ B∗ thatσij = 0 and the boundary point ofL (Γ, p, B∗)
is also a boundary point ofL (Γ, p, B̄∗), whereB̄∗ = B∗\{sij }; if an inequality
from (6) is binding, it holds thatλij = 0 for exactly ones
i
j ∈ B∗ and the
boundary point ofL (Γ, p, B∗) is also a boundary point ofL (Γ, p, B̄∗), where
B̄∗ = B∗ ∪ {sij }. 
If L (Γ, p, B∗) has a boundary point in (0, 1)× Σ, then there is a unique admis-
sible subset̄B∗ such thatL (Γ, p, B̄∗) has this boundary point in common with
L (Γ, p, B∗). The cardinality ofB̄∗ is one less or one greater than the cardinality
of B∗, depending on whether in the common boundary point a strategy inB∗ is
played with probability zero, or whether a strategy not inB∗ is a best response.
The uniqueness of the setB̄∗ implies that the setsL (Γ, p, B∗) andL (Γ, p, B̄∗)
2 Let X be a topological space. It is called an arc if it is homeomorphic to the closed unit interval
[0, 1] and it has two boundary points in this case; it is called a loop if it is homeomorphic to the unit
circle in R2 and it has no boundary points in that case.
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are nicely linked to each other. Generically, it does not happen that three sets
have a common boundary point, nor does it happen that a boundary point of one
set intersects the interior of another set. All this implies thatL (Γ, p) does not
display bifurcations.
If L (Γ, p, B∗) has a boundary point in{0, 1} × Σ, then this point does not
belong to any other setL (Γ, p, B∗). This implies that such a boundary point is
also a boundary point ofL (Γ, p).
Formally, the structure ofL (Γ, p) is as follows.
Theorem 4. For an open set of games Γ ∈ G and priors p ∈ Σ with full
Lebesgue measure, L (Γ, p) is a compact 1-dimensional piecewise C ∞ manifold
with boundary.3 The boundary of L (Γ, p) is given by the intersection of L (Γ, p)
and {0, 1} × Σ. There is a unique boundary point in {0} × Σ.
Proof. See Appendix. 
For almost everyΓ and p, the setL (Γ, p) consists of a finite number of arcs
and loops. Although it is not necessarily the case that these arcs and loops are
smooth, the number of non-differentiabilities is finite at most. Theorem 3 implies
that all arcs inL (Γ, p) start and end in{0, 1} × Σ. Each such path consists
of a finite sequence of smooth arcs of the setsL (Γ, p, B∗). A loop in L (Γ, p)
consists either of a finite sequence (at least two) of differentiable arcs in the sets
L (Γ, p, B∗) or is a loop of the setL (Γ, p, B∗).
Generically, each playeri has a unique best response to the prior, so gener-
ically there is exactly one point ofL (Γ, p) that belongs to{0} × Σ. This point
is both a corner point of{0} × Σ and a boundary point ofL (Γ, p, B∗), where
B∗ consists of the followingn strategies: for each player the best response to the
prior. By Theorem 4 this point is the starting point of a uniquely defined arc of
L (Γ, p). This arc is the unique feasible path ofL (Γ, p) that transforms prior
beliefs into equilibrium beliefs.
Corollary 1. For an open set of games Γ ∈ G and priors p ∈ Σ with full
Lebesgue measure, the linear tracing procedure is well-defined.
By following the feasible path starting in the unique pointL (Γ, p) ∩ ({0} ∩ Σ)
we find a Nash equilibrium of the gameΓ . The setL (Γ, p)∩ ({1}×Σ) consists
of all equilibria of the gameΓ . Precisely one of these equilibria is an element
of the feasible path ofL (Γ, p). Any other equilibrium is a boundary point of
L (Γ, p) and is therefore part of some arc ofL (Γ, p). A moment of reflection
makes clear that the remaining equilibria are pairwise connected by arcs from
L (Γ, p), and so the number of Nash equilibria is odd.
Corollary 2. For an open set of games Γ ∈ G with full Lebesgue measure, the
number of Nash equilibria is odd.
We illustrate the theorems by means of an example. Consider the gameΓ depicted
in Figure 1 coming from Harsanyi and Selten [9]. We take for the priorp =
3 A compact 1-dimensional piecewiseC ∞ manifold with boundary is a finite collection of arcs
and loops with at most a finite number of non-differentiabilities.



















































Figure 2. GamesΓ 0 andΓ t
Table 1. Description of the setsL (Γ, p, B∗)
B∗ L (Γ, p, B∗)
{s11 , s21}
{
(t , (s11 , s
2
1))
∣∣ t ∈ [ 35 , 1]}
{s11 , s22}
{
(t , (s11 , s
2
2))
∣∣ t ∈ [0, 12 ]}
{s12 , s21} ∅
{s12 , s22}
{
(t , (s12 , s
2
2))
∣∣ t ∈ [ 12 , 1]}
{s11 , s21 , s22}
{
( 35 , (s
1
1 , (r , 1 − r)))
∣∣ r ∈ [ 19 , 1]}
{s12 , s21 , s22} ∅
{s11 , s12 , s21} ∅
{s11 , s12 , s22}
{
( 12 , ((r , 1 − r), s22)) | r ∈ [0, 1]
}
{s11 , s12 , s21 , s22}
{


















. This prior yields the gameΓ 0 depicted in Figure 2 as
our starting game.
In Table 1 the setL (Γ, p, B∗) is described for all admissible setsB∗.
Figure 3 shows the feasible path of the linear tracing procedureL (Γ, p) =⋃
B∗ L (Γ, p, B
∗).
The feasible path of the linear tracing procedure starts in the point
(




with B∗ = {s11 , s22}. As long ast < 12, the equalities (1)-(4) determine the feasible
path. At t = 12 inequality (6) belonging to strategys
1
2 is binding, which implies
that the second pure strategy of player 1 is a best response to a belief of player 1
that puts probability 1/2 on the prior and probability 1/2 on strategys22. A further
continuation of the path determined by the equalities (1)-(4) without changing the















Figure 3. The linear tracing procedure
set B∗ would make the value of λ12 negative and thereby violates inequality (6).
We have to expand B∗ by including strategy s12 . Our new B
∗ becomes {s11 , s12 , s22 }.



















. Continuing with the current B∗ violates inequality (5), since
σ11 becomes negative. We delete strategy s
1
1 from B
∗ and our new B∗ becomes
{s12 , s22 }. The equalities (1)-(4) related to this B∗ determine the remainder of the
path leading to a Nash equilibrium of the game.
The observations made so far suggest the following algorithm for the com-
putation of the Nash equilibrium selected by the tracing procedure in n-person
games. Define the admissible set B∗ that contains for each player i the best
response to the prior and start with a point (0, σ) in L (Γ, p, B∗) such that σi
is a best response of player i to the prior. Theorem 4 implies that B∗ and σ
are uniquely determined. The equalities (1)-(4) belonging to this B∗ determine at
least a part of the feasible path. As long as the inequalities (5)-(8) hold with strict
inequality we do not have to change our B∗. As soon as one of the inequalities
from (5) or (6) gets binding, we have to change the set B∗. When the binding
inequality belongs to (5), say σij = 0 while s
i
j ∈ B∗, we have to delete sij out of
B∗. Obviously, this cannot happen for the starting B∗. If the binding inequality
belongs to (6), say λij = 0 while s
i
j ∈ B∗, we have to add strategy sij to B∗. In
both situations there is a strategy sij for which σ
i
j = 0 and λ
i
j = 0. In general this
leads to a kink in the feasible path of the linear tracing procedure. We repeat
this procedure with our new B∗. Note that inequality (7) is only binding in the
starting point. When inequality (8) is binding, a Nash equilibrium is found.
In Figure 3 we have seen that the linear tracing procedure determined a whole
range of equilibria at t = 12 . In general, it is even possible that the linear tracing
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procedure buckles and moves backwards in t (see section 4.19 of Harsanyi and
Selten [9] for an explicit example).
4 A differentiable approach
The previous section presents a method that can be used for the computation of
a Nash equilibrium, in particular the Nash equilibrium selected by the Harsanyi-
Selten theory. A potential drawback of that method is that one has to check out
all the time whether the system of equalities used is still appropriate, and if not,
one has to switch between different systems of equalities.
The idea of switching homotopies has only been used in the literature recently.
In the context of general equilibrium theory with incomplete markets switching
homotopies are used by Brown, DeMarzo and Eaves [1]. In our set-up, switching
homotopies can be a serious problem in terms of computing time. There are∏
i∈N (2
mi − 1) different sets B∗, whereas each one of them may be generated
several times in the course of the algorithm.
We show that for the problem of computing Nash equilibria, switching ho-
motopies can be avoided (in contrast to the incomplete markets problem). It is
possible to formulate one, everywhere differentiable, homotopy. To obtain differ-
entiability a well-chosen transformation of variables is used, which is also used
in Garcia and Zangwill [6], and Herings and Schmedders [13]. Define for all
α ∈ Rm∗
σij (α) = [max{0, αij }]2 and λij (α) = [max{0,−αij }]2.
After this transformation of variables, the Kuhn-Tucker first-order conditions that
provide necessary and sufficient conditions for σi to be a best response against
σ̄−i in the game Γ t̄ become
vi (t̄ , σ̄−i (α), sij ) + λ
i
j (α) − µi = 0, sij ∈ S ∗,
λij (α) ≥ 0, σij (α) ≥ 0, λij (α)σij (α) = 0, sij ∈ S ∗∑mi
j =1σ
i
j (α) − 1 = 0, i ∈ N .
Owing to the proposed transformation of variables, the conditions λij (α) ≥ 0,
σij (α) ≥ 0 and λij (α)σij (α) = 0 are trivially satisfied. We can reformulate the
(in)equalities in (1)-(8) that characterize the set O (Γ, p, B∗) by considering so-
lutions (t , α, µ) ∈ R × Rm∗× Rn with αij ≥ 0 if sij ∈ B∗ and αij ≤ 0 if sij /∈ B∗
such that
(a) vi (t , σ−i (α), sij ) + λ
i





j (α) − 1 = 0, i ∈ N ,
(c) t ≥ 0,
(d) − t + 1 ≥ 0.
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Considering the system of equalities and inequalities (a)-(d) it is striking that
the set B∗ has disappeared. The same system of equalities and inequalities can
be used, irrespective of the set B∗. The role of B∗ is taken over by the vector
α; more precisely, by the sign-combinations of the components of α. Figure 4
illustrates the relation between the vector α and the set B∗.
Figure 4. Relation between σij and α
i





Counting equations and unknowns in the system (a)-(d) shows that there is
one degree of freedom, and therefore one expects a 1-dimensional solution set.
Consider any solution (t , α, µ) to (a)-(d). When αij = 0, then both σ
i
j (α) and
λij (α) are zero. This implies that we have exactly two admissible subsets of
S ∗ for which the set of (in)equalities (1)-(8) are satisfied. If along a solution
curve αij is increasing while passing zero, then σ
i
j (α) gets positive and B
∗
new =
B∗old ∪ {sij }. If αij is decreasing while passing zero, then λij (α) gets negative and
B∗new = B
∗
old\{sij }. Whenever αij passes zero, a kink occurs in L (Γ, p).
The left-hand sides of the equalities (a)-(b) specify the homotopy H : [0, 1]×
R
m∗× Rn → Rm∗× Rn ,
H (t , α, µ) =
(
vi (t , σ−i (α), sij ) + λ
i
j (α) − µi , sij ∈ S ∗∑mi
j =1 σ
i
j (α) − 1, i ∈ N
)
.
The homotopy function H is continuously differentiable. The inequalities (c)
and (d) are satisfied as the homotopy takes [0, 1] as the domain for the variable
t . It has the salient feature that its zeros describe the linear tracing procedure,
(t , α, µ) ∈ H −1({0}) ⇔ (t , σ(α)) ∈ L (Γ, p). Starting at the unique point
(0, α0, µ0) ∈ H −1({0}) at t = 0 and following the path described by the zeros
of H , we end up in a point (1, α̃, µ̃) ∈ H −1({0}). This point generates the
Nash equilibrium σ(α̃) of Γ selected by the Harsanyi-Selten theory.
Theorem 5 specifies the structure of the set of solutions to the homotopy,
H −1({0}).
Theorem 5. For an open set of games Γ ∈ G and priors p ∈ Σ with full
Lebesgue measure, H −1({0}) is a compact 1-dimensional C 1 manifold with
boundary. The boundary of H −1({0}) equals the intersection of H −1({0}) and
{0, 1} × Rm∗× Rn . There is a unique boundary point in {0} × Rm∗× Rn .
Proof. See Appendix. 
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Figure 5. Before and after transformation
The set H −1({0}) consists of finitely many differentiable arcs and loops. All
arcs start and end in {0, 1} × Rm∗× Rn . Loops have no points in common with
{0, 1}×Rm∗×Rn . There is exactly one arc that starts in {0}×Rm∗×Rn and that
ends in {1}×Rm∗×Rn with a point (1, α̃, µ̃) that generates the Nash equilibrium
selected by the tracing procedure. This arc is a transformation of the feasible
path of the tracing procedure. All other arcs start and end in {1}×Rm∗×Rn and
connect two points inducing Nash equilibria of Γ .
The structure of H −1({0}) is even simpler than the one of L (Γ, p). Not
only are complications like bifurcations, spirals, higher dimensional solutions
sets, diverging behavior, etc., excluded. The arcs and loops in H −1({0}) are
differentiable everywhere. It is the transformation of variables that smoothes out
the kinks. As a direct consequence, it is possible to calculate the derivative at
each point of the feasible path, which makes it possible to follow the path by
means of differentiable as opposed to simplicial methods.
We return to the example of the previous section. It is very convenient to
describe the variables t , σ, λ, α and µ as functions of pathlength τ . If we do so,
the feasible path of the linear tracing procedure is shown in Figure 5.
The first plot in Figure 5 shows t , σ and λ as a function of pathlength. To
make the picture more clear, only informative values of the variables are depicted.
In particular this means that for each pure strategy sij , either σ
i
j or −λij is plotted,
depending on which one is non-zero. The second plot shows the values of t and
α as a function of pathlength and therefore corresponds to the feasible path of
the tracing procedure after the transformation.
The first plot shows that kinks appear for all variables when s11 and s
1
2 are
passing zero. In the second plot no kinks appear at all. In that plot, when s11
or s12 passes zero, the derivatives of all variables with respect to pathlength are
equal to zero, except the variable passing zero. This is a general phenomenon
and follows from the proofs in the appendix.
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5 Implementation
This section is devoted to the implementation of the homotopy function. Because
of differentiability of the homotopy path, it is possible to apply standard numer-
ical path-following techniques that are available in professionally programmed
software.
We have programmed a number of Fortran-subroutines belonging to the
software-package Hompack, a Fortran77 program (see Watson, Billups and
Morgan [25]).4
Hompack provides three qualitatively different algorithms for tracking the
zero curve of the homotopy: ordinary differential equation-based, normal flow,
and augmented Jacobian matrix. Separate routines are also provided for dense
and sparse matrices. The algorithm we used for implication is fixpdf, which is
an ordinary differential equation-based algorithm working with dense Jacobian
matrices. We used fixpdf because this algorithm is more robust than the others
even though this may come at the cost of higher computing times.
We parameterize the homotopy path by pathlength τ . Thus t = t(τ ), α = α(τ )
and µ = µ(τ ) along the homotopy path, and H (t(τ ), α(τ ), µ(τ )) = 0 identically
in τ . The differential equation is characterized by
d
dτ



















and initial conditions given by
(t(0), α(0), µ(0)) = H −1({0}) ∩ ({0} × Rm∗× Rn ).
The homotopy path corresponds to the trajectory of the initial value problem.
When t(τ̄ ) = 1, (α(τ̄ ), µ(τ̄ )) is a zeropoint of H and σ(α(τ̄ )) is a Nash equi-
librium of game Γ with equilibrium payoff µ(τ̄ ). All details about solving the
initial value problem are in Watson [23] and Watson and Fenner [24].
We have implemented the homotopy function as described in Section 4. It
may be possible to improve on computing times by using a transformation with
a power less than 2, or by rescaling utilities and probabilities. Moreover, Hom-
pack provides the possibility to adjust a number of parameters, mainly related
to the accuracy by which the homotopy path is followed. An extensive digress
on the optimal numerical implementation of the homotopy is beyond the scope
of the current paper.
Among others we applied our program to the example of Harsanyi and Selten
from the previous sections. Figure 6 shows five plots. The first plot corresponds
to the homotopy-variable t and is plotted with respect to pathlength τ . Each of
the other four plots correspond to a homotopy-variable αij , i = 1, 2, j = 1, 2.
4 http://www.netlib.org/hompack/index.html
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Figure 6. The behavior of the homotopy-variables along the zero curve
These variables are also plotted as a function of pathlength. For all five plots,
the dashed lines show the analytical solution path and the solid lines show the
numerical solution paths.
For some pairs (n, m), where n is the number of players and m the common
number of pure strategies they have, we have generated five randomly chosen
games. All payoffs are chosen independently from one another out of the uniform
distribution on [0, 1]. The prior is chosen such that the players play all their
strategies with equal probability. Table 2 shows the mean time (in seconds) and
the mean number of function evaluations needed to compute a Nash equilibrium.
Furthermore, between brackets, the standard deviations are given.
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Table 2. Computation times and number of function evaluations
m\n 2 3 4 5
2 0.28 (0.13) 0.40 (0.05) 0.79 (0.19) 2.28 (1.15)
44.20 (23.79) 143.60 (20.94) 136.40 (40.92) 178.40 (111.69)
3 0.33 (0.09) 1.57 (0.56) 7.48 (4.29) 44.87 (12.10)
127.40 (33.70) 272.60 (156.79) 355.40 (227.83) 455.20 (122.19)
4 0.51 (0.32) 2.73 (0.61) 104.94 (108.22) 519.44 (332.60)
151.60 (152.50) 197.40 (54.04) 1036.80 (945.71) 824.40 (381.34)
5 0.98 (0.31) 16.89 (12.02) 360.16 (250.91)
233.20 (98.51) 589.20 (362.91) 1215.40 (730.73)
6 1.14 (0.35) 24.84 (25.97) 442.47 (147.78)
182.00 (64.39) 461.80 (481.87) 686.00 (201.86)
7 2.51 (1.39) 51.59 (43.43)
339.60 (207.47) 520.60 (396.45)
8 3.97 (1.74) 179.90 (162.42)





The table shows that computation times were less than 1 minute for most
cases analyzed. The standard deviation of computation times is fairly large. This
can be explained by the fact that sometimes the best response to the prior is a
Nash equilibrium, in which case the homotopy path is a straight line from t = 0
to t = 1. In other cases, none of the strategies played with positive probability
against the prior is played with positive probability in a Nash equilibrium. The
resulting homotopy path is curly and takes a long time to be tracked.
The table clearly conveys the impression that the mean computation time
and the mean number of function evaluations is greater when a large number of
agents each have a small number of pure strategies than when a small number
of agents each have many pure strategies. (in the Table horizontally the numbers
increase faster than vertically).
The maximal inaccuracy of our calculation amounts to 10−4, which means
that the 2-norm of the value of the homotopy function is less than 10−4 in the
computed equilibrium. From the specification of the homotopy function, this
implies that the gain in payoff from a unilateral deviation by a player is at most
10−4.
For (a number of) the same pairs (n, m), Table 3 shows an estimation of the
mean number of Nash equilibria with between brackets the standard error of the
estimation (see Table 9 of McLennan [20]). This suggests that multiplicity of
Nash equilibria is a serious problem in game theory and that the specific method
used for equilibrium selection is of crucial importance.
Our homotopy also provides the possibility to investigate how sensitive the
Nash equilibrium selected by the linear tracing procedure is with respect to the
choice of the prior. For the same pairs as before, we have randomly generated five
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Table 3. Number of equilibria
m\n 2 3 4 5
2 1.31 (0.13) 2.15 (0.20) 4.49 (0.40) 6.98 (0.43)
3 1.52 (0.12) 3.76 (0.33) 18.01 (1.22) 81.82 (3.32)
4 1.77 (0.18) 12.66 (1.13) 82.49 (3.87) 879.24 (32.94)
5 2.64 (0.44) 27.23 (2.78) 440.02 (18.86)
6 2.61 (0.52) 65.69 (4.19) 2036.54 (65.98)
7 4.62 (0.41) 151.80 (3.88)
8 5.52 (0.37) 355.63 (8.60)
9 6.74 (0.44)
10 8.55 (0.54)
Table 4. Multiplicity by variation of prior
m\n 2 3 4 5
2 1.00 (0.00) 1.20 (0.45) 1.40 (0.55) 1.40 (0.89)
3 1.00 (0.00) 2.20 (0.84) 2.60 (1.14) 3.80 (0.84)
4 1.20 (0.45) 2.40 (0.89) 4.00 (0.71) 4.60 (0.89)
5 1.40 (0.55) 2.20 (1.10) 4.00 (1.41)
6 1.20 (0.45) 2.40 (0.89) 4.80 (0.45)
7 1.80 (0.45) 3.40 (0.55)
8 1.60 (0.89) 2.80 (1.48)
9 1.40 (0.89)
10 2.00 (1.00)
such games and computed for each game a Nash equilibrium for five randomly
generated priors. Table 4 shows the average number of different Nash equilibria
found, with the standard deviation given between brackets.
Since we try five different priors , the maximal number of different Nash
equilibria that can be found in our set-up is five. Notice that for cases with 4
or 5 players, each having at least 4 pure strategies, the average number found
in our computations is above four, so close to the maximum possible. When the
number of players is 2, the average number of different Nash equilibria found is
less than two, so close to the minimum possible. This confirms again that games
with many players are far more difficult in all respects than games with few
players. It also shows that multiplicity of Nash equilibria is a serious problem,
and that the equilibrium selection method used is likely to be crucial.
6 Summary
This paper shows that generically the linear tracing procedure consists of a finite
number of piecewise smooth arcs and loops. From this structure it is concluded
that the linear tracing procedure is well-defined for almost all normal form games.
We define an everywhere differentiable homotopy function, whose zeros corre-
spond one-to-one to elements of the linear tracing procedure. From this it is
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proved that the set of zeros of the homotopy function consists of a finite number
of smooth arcs and loops. Finally, this homotopy function is used to compute the
equilibrium selected by the tracing procedure numerically. We follow the unique
smooth feasible path using a mathematical software package, which is able to
follow smooth homotopy-paths numerically. In this way, we have constructed
the first globally convergent algorithm that exploits the differentiability present
in normal form games. The numerical performance of the algorithm is analyzed
extensively. Further, it is showed that multiple equilibria can be found by varying
the prior expectations.
A Proofs
To make the proofs as transparent as possible, we need some notations and
definitions from the theory of regular constraint sets as presented in Jongen,
Jonker and Twilt [14], see also Herings [10] for a first application of this theory
in economics.
For some r ≥ 1 a subset M of Rm is called a k -dimensional C r manifold
with generalized boundary (MGB), if for every x̄ ∈ M there exists a C r diffeo-
morphism φ : U → V , where U is an open subset of Rm containing x̄ and V is
open in Rm , and some integer (x̄ ) ≥ 0, such that φ(x̄ ) = 0 and φ(U ∩M ) equals
{y ∈ V | yi = 0, i = 1, . . . , m − k , and yi ≥ 0, i = m − k + 1, . . . , m − k + (x̄ )}.
If for every element x̄ of an MGB M it holds that (x̄ ) ≤ 1, then M is called
a manifold with boundary and the set of elements x̄ for which (x̄ ) = 1 is an
(k − 1)-dimensional manifold, called the boundary of M .
Let J 1 and J 2 be two finite index sets and let gj for all j ∈ J 1 and hj for all
j ∈ J 2, be C r functions defined on some open subset X of Rm . We define
M [g, h] =
{
x ∈ X
∣∣∣∣ gj (x ) = 0, ∀j ∈ J 1, and hj (x ) ≥ 0, ∀j ∈ J 2
}
.
For x ∈ X we define the set J 0(x ) = {j ∈ J 2 |hj (x ) = 0}. If for every x̄ ∈ M [g, h]
it holds that {
∂xgj (x̄ )




∂x hj (x̄ )
∣∣∣∣ j ∈ J 0(x̄ )
}
is a set of independent vectors, then M [g, h] is called a C r regular constraint set
(RCS). In Jongen, Jonker and Twilt [14] it is shown that every C r RCS is an
(m − |J 1|)-dimensional C r MGB with (x̄ ) = |J 0(x̄ )| for every x̄ ∈ M [g, h].
Fix the number of pure strategies for each player, and fix a prior p ∈ Σ.
For any tuple of utility functions u and any admissible subset B∗, we define the
functions gB
∗,u : R1+2m
∗+n → R2m∗+n and hB∗,u : R1+2m∗+n → Rm∗+2 in such a
way that gB
∗,u equals the left-hand side of the equalities (1)-(4) and hB
∗,u the
left-hand side of the inequalities (5)-(8),
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gB
∗,u (t , σ, λ, µ) =


vi (t , σ−i , sij ) + λ
i



























A point (t , σ, λ, µ) is a solution of (1)-(8) if and only if gB
∗,u (t , σ, λ, µ) = 0 and
hB
∗,u (t , σ, λ, µ) ≥ 0.
Once the number of pure strategies of each player is fixed, a noncooperative
game is completely determined by the tuple of utility functions u , which can
be represented by a vector in Rmn . The standard topology and measure on Rmn
therefore induce a topology and a measure on games. For every u ∈ Rmn , we
define the functions gB
∗
: R1+2m
∗+n × Rnm → R2m∗+n and hB∗ : R1+2m∗+n ×
R
nm → Rm∗+2 by gB∗ (t , σ, λ, µ, u) = gB∗,u (t , σ, λ, µ) and hB∗ (t , σ, λ, µ, u) =
hB






























0 0 I 0 0 0
0 0 I 0 0 0
0 E 0 0 0
0 I 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 I 0 0
1 0 0 0 0
−1 0 0 0 0
where
E (i , si
′
j ′ ) =
{









 for all s
−k ∈ S −k∑
s−i ∈S −i ∂ui (s−i ,sij )
vi (t , σ−i , sij ) = 1.
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Each row in Figure 7 corresponds to one of the equalities and inequalities
in (1)-(8). To make the figure more clear, derivatives with respect to σ are first
taken for sij ∈ B∗. The first applies to the derivatives with respect to λ and the
ordering of the equalities in (1). From the properties listed below the matrix, it
follows that the matrices ∂uv and E have full row rank.
The structure of the proof of Theorem 2 is as follows. First, it is shown that
for almost all games u , M [gB
∗,u , hB
∗,u ] is a regular constraint set, from which
the manifold structure of L (Γ, p, B∗) follows immediately. Next it is shown that
there is an open set of full measure for which the manifold structure holds. The
proof of the first part is done when it is shown that for almost all games u , for












∣∣∣∣ j ∈ J 0(x̄ )
}
is a set of independent vectors. To show this we need three lemmas, Lemmas 1,
2 and 3. Lemma 1 is used to handle points x̄ for which J 0(x̄ ) = ∅, Lemma 2 deals
with points x̄ such that the cardinality of J 0(x̄ ) is one, and Lemma 3 implies that
J 0(x̄ ) contains one element at most.
Lemma 1. Let a prior p ∈ Σ and an admissible subset B∗ of S ∗ be given. Then,
for almost all u, gB
∗,u {0}.
Proof. Consider a point (t̄ , σ̄, λ̄, µ̄, ū) such that gB
∗
(t̄ , σ̄, λ̄, µ̄, ū) = 0. The matrix
of partial derivatives of gB
∗
at (t̄ , σ̄, λ̄, µ̄, ū) is given by the rows (1)-(4) in
Figure 7. We show first that this matrix has full row rank, from which it follows
that gB
∗ {0}.
Since ∂uv(·) has full row rank and the derivative with respect to u in (2)-(4)
is zero, it is sufficient to show that the part of the matrix given by (2)-(4) has
full row rank. Since the derivative with respect to λ in (3) has full row rank,
whereas the derivative with respect to λ in (2) and (4) is zero, it is sufficient
to show that the rows in (2) and (4) are independent. The admissibility of B∗
implies that the derivative with respect to σB∗ in (4) has full row rank. Since,
the derivative with respect to σB∗ in (2) is zero, the only thing left to prove is
that (2) has independent rows, which is obvious from the derivative with respect
to σS ∗\B∗ . Consequently, gB
∗ {0}.
By the transversality theorem (see, for example Mas-Colell [18], theorem
I.2.2) and since gB
∗
is a C ∞ function, it follows that the complement of { u ∈
R
nm | gB∗,u {0} } has Lebesgue measure zero. 
Lemma 2. Let a prior p ∈ Σ and an admissible subset B∗ of S ∗ be given.




j ′ ) {0}.
Proof. Take (t̄ , σ̄, λ̄, µ̄, ū) such that gB
∗
(t̄ , σ̄, λ̄, µ̄, ū) = 0 and hB
∗
j ′ (t̄ , σ̄, λ̄, µ̄, ū) =




j ′ ) at (t̄ , σ̄, λ̄, µ̄, ū) is given in
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Figure 7 by the rows (1)-(4) and a single row related to hB
∗
j ′ in (5)-(8). We show




j ′ ) {0}.
If row j ′ belongs to (6), (7) or (8), then it follows from the derivative with
respect to λS ∗\B∗ or from the derivative with respect to t that row j ′ has rank 1.
Since all other derivatives in row j ′ are zero, it follows as in the proof of Lemma 1
that the rows of (1)-(4) together with row j ′ are independent. Consider the case
where row j ′ belongs to (5). Following the first part of the proof of Lemma 1, it
suffices to prove that (2) and (4) together with row j ′ are independent. Inequality
hB
∗
j ′ states that σ
i





j − 1 = 0, it follows that |B∗ ∩ S i | > 1. Then the





j ′ ) {0}. By the transversality theorem it follows that the
complement of {u ∈ Rnm | (gB∗,u , hB∗,uj ′ ) {0}} has Lebesgue measure zero. 
Lemma 3. Let a prior p ∈ Σ and an admissible subset B∗ of S ∗ be given.
Moreover, let inequalities j ′, j ′′ ∈ {1, . . . , m∗ + 2} with j ′ /= j ′′ be given. Then,
for almost all u, (gB
∗,u , hB
∗,u




Proof. Consider (t̄ , σ̄, λ̄, µ̄, ū) such that gB
∗
(t̄ , σ̄, λ̄, µ̄, ū) = 0, hB
∗
j ′ (t̄ , σ̄, λ̄, µ̄, ū) =
0, and hB
∗
j ′′ (t̄ , σ̄, λ̄, µ̄, ū) = 0. The matrix of partial derivatives of (g
B∗ , hB
∗
j ′ , h
B∗
j ′′ )
at (t̄ , σ̄, λ̄, µ̄, ū) is given in Figure 7 by the rows (1)-(4) and two rows related to
hB
∗
j ′ and h
B∗
j ′′ in (5)-(8). We show first that this matrix has full row rank, from




j ′ , h
B∗
j ′′ ) {0}.
The case where the two rows are not equal to (7) and (8) is similar to
the proof of Lemma 2. Rows (7) and (8) are not independent. However, they





j ′ , h
B∗
j ′′ ) {0}. It follows that the complement of the set
{u ∈ Rnm | (gB∗,u , hB∗,uj ′ , hB
∗,u
j ′′ ) {0}} has Lebesgue measure zero. 
Proof of Theorem 2 Fix n and mi , i ∈ N . Fix a prior p ∈ Σ and an admissi-




j ′ ) {0} for all j ′ ∈ {1, . . . , m∗ + 2}, and (gB
∗,u , hB
∗,u
j ′ , h
B∗,u
j ′′ ) {0}
for all j ′, j ′′ ∈ {1, . . . , m∗ + 2} with j ′ /= j ′′, has full measure by Lemmas 1, 2
and 3.
Consider any u ∈ U . We show that M [gB∗,u , hB∗,u ] is a regular constraint











∣∣∣∣ j ∈ J 0(x̄ )
}
is a set of independent vectors. When J 0(x̄ ) = ∅ this is a consequence of Lemma 1,
when |J 0(x̄ )| = 1 a consequence of Lemma 2. Suppose |J 0(x̄ )| ≥ 2 and choose
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}
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is a set of independent vectors, which leads to a contradiction as the set con-
tains 2m∗ + n + 2 vectors of dimension 2m∗ + n + 1. Consequently, |J 0(x̄ )| ≤ 1,
and M [gB
∗,u , hB
∗,u ] is a regular constraint set. It follows that O (Γ, p, B∗) is a
1-dimensional manifold with boundary, and that the boundary of O (Γ, p, B∗) is
given by the elements x̄ ∈ M [gB∗,u , hB∗,u ] for which |J 0(x̄ )| = 1. Therefore, a
point in O (Γ, p, B∗) is a boundary point if and only if exactly one of the inequal-
ities in (5)-(8) holds with equality. These properties carry over to L (Γ, p, B∗)
since it is diffeomorphic to O (Γ, p, B∗) by Theorem 1.
Compactness of L (Γ, p, B∗) is obvious.
It remains to be shown that there is an open set of games and priors with
full Lebesgue measure for which the asserted properties hold. Let Ω be the set
of all noncooperative games an priors and let ΩB
∗
be the subset of Ω consisting
of all pairs (Γ, p) for which the transversality statements in Lemma 1, Lemma 2
and Lemma 3 hold. It has already been shown that Ω\ΩB∗ has Lebesgue mea-
sure zero. If (Γ, p) ∈ Ω\ΩB∗ , then there exist (t , σ, λ, µ) ∈ R2m∗+n+1 such that







(y , Γ, p) ∈ R2m∗+n+1 × Ω
∣∣∣∣
gB





≤ 2m∗ + n − 1








≤ 2m∗ + n
∃j ′, j ′′, j ′ /= j ′′, gB∗,u,p(y) = hB∗,u,pj ′ (y) = hB
∗,u,p





∗,u,p makes the dependence on the prior p explicit.
The set ΞB
∗
is closed since it is obtained by finite unions and intersections of
closed sets. We define the projection π : ΞB
∗ → Ω by
π(t , σ, λ, µ, Γ, p) = (Γ, p) for all (t , σ, λ, µ, Γ, p) ∈ ΞB∗ .
It holds that π(ΞB
∗
) = Ω\ΩB∗ . We show that π is proper, i.e., that π−1(K )
is compact if K is a compact subset of Ω. Let K be a compact subset of Ω.
Clearly, π−1(K ) is a closed subset of the set ΞB
∗
, which is easily seen to be
compact, and therefore π−1(K ) is compact. Since the image by a continuous
proper mapping of a closed set is closed, it follows that π(ΞB
∗
) = Ω \ ΩB∗ is
closed, so ΩB
∗
is open. Since there is a finite number of admissible subsets B∗
of S ∗, the intersection of the sets ΩB
∗
over all admissible subsets B∗ is an open
set of full Lebesgue measure of games and priors with the properties as stated
in the theorem. 
Proof of Theorem 4 Fix any game and any prior the open set of games Γ ∈ G
and priors p ∈ Σ with full Lebesgue measure of Theorem 2. For any B∗ it holds
that L (Γ, p, B∗) is a compact 1-dimensional C ∞ manifold with boundary, so it
consists of a finite number of arcs and loops. Each arc in L (Γ, p, B∗) has two
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endpoints. If it has an endpoint as in alternative (i) of Theorem 3, then it does
not belong to any L (Γ, p, B̄∗) for B̄∗ /= B∗ and lies in {0, 1} × Σ. Therefore, it
is a boundary point of L (Γ, p). If an arc has an endpoint as in alternative (ii) of
Theorem 3, then it belongs to (0, 1) × Σ and there exists exactly one B̄∗ /= B∗
such that this endpoint is also an endpoint of an arc in L (Γ, p, B̄∗). This arc in
L (Γ, p, B̄∗) has another endpoint that either satisfies alternative (i) of Theorem 3
or alternative (ii) of Theorem 3. In the former case an endpoint of L (Γ, p) in
{0, 1} × Σ has been found. In the latter case, the endpoint belongs to (0, 1) × Σ
and there is exists exactly one B̃∗ /= B̄∗ such that this endpoint is also an endpoint
of an arc in L (Γ, p, B̃∗), and so on.
Since there is a finite number of admissible subsets B∗ ⊆ S ∗, and each
L (Γ, p, B∗) consists of finitely many arcs and loops, it will either be the case that
eventually an arc is generated with an endpoint as in alternative (i) of Theorem 3,
or an arc is generated that has been generated before. In the latter case, we have
found a piecewise C ∞ loop of L (Γ, p). In the former case, the finite chain
of arcs constitutes a piecewise C ∞ arc of L (Γ, p) with endpoints belonging
to {0, 1} × Σ. Indeed, starting from the endpoint already found in {0, 1} × Σ
and generating the chain of arcs in L (Γ, p, B∗) for various admissible subsets
B∗, will either lead to another endpoint of L (Γ, p) in {0, 1} × Σ or to the
generation of an endpoint of some L (Γ, p, B∗) in (0, 1) × Σ that has been
generated before. The latter case is excluded as this point would be an endpoint
of three different arcs, which violates Theorem 3. It follows that L (Γ, p) is
a compact 1-dimensional piecewise C ∞ manifold with boundary, where the
boundary is given by the intersection of L (Γ, p) and {0, 1} × Σ. The reader
might have observed that the argument to show this is nothing but a nonlinear
version of the door-in door-out principle of Lemke and Howson [17].
It remains to be shown that there is a unique boundary point in {0} × Σ.
Notice that (0, σ) ∈ L (Γ, p) if and only if for all i , σi is a best response against
the prior p. If there would be more than one best response for some player, then
there would be at least two pure best responses for some player when t = 0,
which contradicts Lemma 3. 
Lemma 4. For an open set of games Γ ∈ G and priors p ∈ Σ with full Lebesgue
measure, ∂(t,α,µ)H (t̄ , ᾱ, µ̄) has full rank for all (t̄ , ᾱ, µ̄) with H (t̄ , ᾱ, µ̄) = 0,
∂(α,µ)H (0, ᾱ, µ̄) has full rank when H (0, ᾱ, µ̄) = 0, and ∂(α,µ)H (1, ᾱ, µ̄) has
full rank for all (ᾱ, µ̄) with H (1, ᾱ, µ̄) = 0.
Proof. Fix any game and any prior in the open set of games Γ ∈ G and priors
p ∈ Σ with full Lebesgue measure of Theorem 2. In Figure 8 the Jacobian of
H is shown. To simplify the exposition of this Jacobian, the strategies sij are
first ordered according to whether αij is positive or not.
The Jacobian of H can be decomposed as the product of the two matrices
shown in Figure 9. The first matrix equals the rows in (1) and (4) of Figure 7
when B∗ = {sij ∈ S ∗ |αij > 0}. Because gB
∗,u {0}, this matrix has full rank. In
the second matrix, the notation Λ(2α) is used to represent a diagonal matrix with
the components of the vector 2α on the diagonal. The second matrix contains at
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{
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Figure 8. The Jacobian of the homotopy function H
least m∗ zero rows. Since it cannot be the case that two variables αij are zero at
the same time, the second matrix contains at most m∗ + 1 zero rows.
∂t ∂σ ∂λ ∂µ































Figure 9. Decomposition of the Jacobian of H into two matrices
We delete the m∗ zero rows in the middle part of the second matrix and the
corresponding columns in the first matrix. The product of the resulting matrices
remains equal to the Jacobian of H . By deleting the zero rows in the second
and the corresponding columns in the first matrix both matrices do not drop rank.
For the second matrix this is obvious. For the first matrix, note that after deletion
of the columns, it is equal to the submatrix of Figure 7 that results after applying
Gaussian elimination to the rows in (1) and (4) by the rows in (2) and (3), and
therefore has full rank.
If αij /= 0 for all strategies s
i
j , then the remaining second matrix is a diagonal
matrix with non-zero entries on the diagonal, so it has full rank. As a conse-
quence, the product of the remaining matrices and thereby the Jacobian of H
has full rank.
If αk = 0 for a certain strategy s
k
 , then the remaining second matrix has still
one zero row. After deletion of this row, the remaining second matrix still has full
rank. After deletion of the corresponding column, the remaining first matrix also
has full rank, as it is equal to the submatrix of Figure 7 that results after applying
Gaussian elimination to the rows in (1) and (4) by the rows in (2) and (3), and the
row in (6) corresponding to sk . As the remaining first matrix is a square matrix,
it follows that the product of the remaining matrices, and thereby the Jacobian of
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the homotopy function, has full rank. Consequently, ∂(t,α,µ)H (t̄ , ᾱ, µ̄) has full
rank for all (t̄ , ᾱ, µ̄) with H (t̄ , ᾱ, µ̄) = 0.
If we want to prove that ∂(α,µ)H (0, ᾱ, µ̄) has full rank when H (0, ᾱ, µ̄) = 0,
and that ∂(α,µ)H (1, ᾱ, µ̄) has full rank for all (ᾱ, µ̄) with H (1, ᾱ, µ̄) = 0, we
have to consider the matrix in Figure 8 without the first column. That matrix can
be decomposed as the product of the matrices of Figure 9 with the first column
of the first matrix and both the first row and the first column of the second
matrix deleted. The resulting second matrix contains exactly m∗ zero rows, as
none of the variables αij equals zero when t = 0 or t = 1. We delete the m
∗ zero
rows of the second matrix and the corresponding columns in the first matrix.
The product of the resulting matrices remains equal to the Jacobian of H . The
resulting first matrix is equal to the submatrix of Figure 7 that is obtained after
applying Gaussian elimination to the rows in (1) and (4) by the rows in (2) and
(3), and the row in (7) when t = 0 or the row in (8) when t = 1. Therefore, both
the resulting first matrix and the resulting second matrix are square matrices with
full rank, and so is their product. Consequently, ∂(α,µ)H (0, ᾱ, µ̄) has full rank
for all (ᾱ, µ̄) with H (0, ᾱ, µ̄) = 0, and ∂(α,µ)H (1, ᾱ, µ̄) has full rank for all
(ᾱ, µ̄) with H (1, ᾱ, µ̄) = 0. 
Proof of Theorem 5 Fix any game and any prior in the open set of games
Γ ∈ G and priors p ∈ Σ with full Lebesgue measure of Theorem 2. Consider
the following system of equalities and inequalities,
H (t , α, µ) = 0,
t ≥ 0,
−t + 1 ≥ 0.
The set of solutions to this system equals H −1({0}). It is a regular constraint
set by Lemma 4 and is therefore a 1-dimensional C 1 manifold with boundary as
described in the theorem. The compactness of H −1({0}) follows trivially. The
uniqueness of the boundary point in {0}×Rm∗×Rn carries over from Theorem 4.

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5. Garcia, C.B., Lemke, C.E., Lüthi, H.J.: Simplicial approximation of an equilibrium point of non-
cooperative N -person games. In: Hu, T.C., Robinson, S.M. (eds.) Mathematical programming,
pp. 227–260. New York: Academic Press 1973
6. Garcia, C.B., Zangwill, W.I.: Pathways to solutions, fixed points, and equilibria. Englewood
Cliffs: Prentice Hall 1981
A differentiable homotopy to compute Nash equilibria 185
7. Harsanyi, J.C.: Oddness of the number of equilibrium points: a new proof. International Journal
of Game Theory 2, 235–250 (1973)
8. Harsanyi, J.C.: The tracing procedure: a Bayesian approach to defining a solution for n-person
noncooperative games. International Journal of Game Theory 4, 61–94 (1975)
9. Harsanyi, J.C., Selten, R.: A general theory of equilibrium selection in games. Cambridge: MIT
Press 1988
10. Herings, P.J.J.: A globally and universally stable price adjustment process. Journal of Mathe-
matical Economics 27, 163–193 (1997)
11. Herings, P.J.J.: Two simple proofs of the feasibility of the linear tracing procedure. Economic
Theory 15, 485–490 (2000)
12. Herings, P.J.J., Elzen, A.H. van den: Computation of the Nash equilibrium selected by the tracing
procedure in N -person games. Tilburg: CentER Discussion Paper, No. 9804, Tilburg University.
Games and Economic Behavior (accepted) (2001)
13. Herings, P.J.J., Schmedders, K.: Computing equilibria in finance economies with incomplete
markets and transaction costs. Meteor Research Memorandum 00/34, University of Maastricht,
Maastricht (2000)
14. Jongen, H.Th., Jonker, P., Twilt, F.: Nonlinear optimization in Rn , I. Morse theory, Chebyshev
approximation. Methoden und Verfahren der mathematischen Physik, vol. 29. Frankfurt: Peter
Lang 1983
15. Judd, K.L.: Computational economics and economic theory: substitutes and complements? Jour-
nal of Economic Dynamics and Control 21, 907–942 (1997)
16. Laan, G. van der, Talman, A.J.J., Heijden L. van der: Simplicial variable dimension algorithms
for Solving the nonlinear complementarity problem on a product of unit simplices using a general
labelling. Mathematics of Operation Research 12, 377–397 (1987)
17. Lemke, C.E., Howson J.T. Jr.: Equilibrium points of bimatrix games. SIAM Journal on Applied
Mathematics 12, 413–423 (1964)
18. Mas-Colell, A.: The theory of general economic equilibrium: a differentiable approach. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press 1985
19. McKelvey, R.D., McLennan, A.: Computation of equilibria in finite games. In: Amman, H.M.,
Kendrick, D.A., Rust, J. (eds.) Handbook of computational economics, vol. I, pp. 87–142. Am-
sterdam: Elsevier 1996
20. McLennan, A.: The expected number of Nash equilibria of a normal form game. Mimeo (1999)
21. Rosenmüller, J.: On a generalization of the Lemke–Howson algorithm to noncooperative N -
person games. SIAM Journal on Applied Mathematics 21, 73–79 (1971)
22. Schanuel, S.H., Simon, L.K., Zame, W.R.: The algebraic geometry of games and the tracing
procedure. In: Selten, R. (ed.) Game equilibrium models II, methods, morals and markets, pp.
9–43. Berlin Heidelberg New York: Springer 1991
23. Watson, L.T.: A globally convergent algorithm for computing fixed points of C 2 maps. Applied
Mathematic and Computation 5, 297–311 (1979)
24. Watson, L.T., Fenner, D.: Chow-Yorke algorithm for fixed points or zeros of C 2 maps. ACM
Transactions on Mathematical Software 6, 252–260 (1980)
25. Watson, L.T., Billups, S.C., Morgan, A.P.: HOMPACK: a suite of codes for globally convergent
homotopy algorithms. ACM Transactions on Mathematical Software 13, 281–310 (1987)
26. Wilson, R.: Computing equilibria of N -person games. SIAM Journal on Applied Mathematics
21, 80–87 (1971)
